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Abstract
This paper studies the secrecy performance of a wireless network (primary network) overlaid with
an ambient RF energy harvesting Internet of Things (IoT) network (secondary network). The nodes
in the secondary network are assumed to be solely powered by ambient RF energy harvested from
the transmissions of the primary network. We assume that the secondary nodes can eavesdrop on
the primary transmissions due to which the primary network uses secrecy guard zones. The primary
transmitter goes silent if any secondary receiver is detected within its guard zone. Using tools from
stochastic geometry, we derive the probability of successful connection of the primary network as
well as the probability of secure communication. Two conditions must be jointly satisfied in order
to ensure successful connection: (i) the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the primary
receiver is above a predefined threshold, and (ii) the primary transmitter is not silent. In order to ensure
secure communication, the SINR value at each of the secondary nodes should be less than a predefined
threshold. Clearly, when more secondary nodes are deployed, more primary transmitters will remain
silent for a given guard zone radius, thus impacting the amount of energy harvested by the secondary
network. Our results concretely show the existence of an optimal deployment density for the secondary
network that maximizes the density of nodes that can harvest an amount of energy above a predefined
threshold. Furthermore, we show the dependence of this optimal deployment density on the guard zone
radius of the primary network. In addition, we show that the optimal guard zone radius selected by
the primary network is a function of the deployment density of the secondary network. The interesting
coupling between the performance of the two networks is studied using tools from game theory. In
addition, we propose an algorithm that can assist the two networks to converge to Nash equilibrium.
The convergence of this algorithm is verified using simulations. Overall, this work is one of the few
concrete works that symbiotically merge tools from stochastic geometry and game theory.
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2Index Terms
Stochastic geometry, wireless power transfer, physical layer security, game theory, coverage prob-
ability, Poisson Point Process, Poisson hole process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to rapid technological advances, wireless communication networks are undergoing
unprecedented paradigm shifts. One of the most interesting amongst them is the attempt to make
wireless networks virtually self-perpetual in terms of their energy requirements. This is especially
gaining importance in internet-of-things (IoT) realm where it may not be economical to charge
or replace batteries periodically in billions of devices worldwide [2]. In order to achieve this
vision of self-perpetual operation, it is necessary to provide energy harvesting capability to such
networks in addition to reducing energy expenditures through energy-efficient communication
policies [3], [4] and energy efficient hardware [5]. While, in principle, we can use any available
source of energy to power these networks, ambient RF energy harvesting is considered a preferred
option due to its ubiquity [6]. Further, due to the need of deploying these ambient RF energy
harvesting nodes/devices (referred to as energy receivers or ERs in the rest of this paper) close
to the sources of RF signals, concerns on the secrecy of these RF signals were recently raised
in the literature [7]–[13]. While the RF signal source (referred to as primary transmitter or
PT in this paper) transmits confidential messages to legitimate information receivers (IRs), the
existence of ERs close to the PT may enable them to decode these messages. Consequently,
careful study of physical layer security in such systems is required to glean insights on the
new secrecy performance limitations in the presence of ERs. The importance of physical layer
security lies in ensuring the ability of legitimate receivers to decode the confidential messages
while preventing illegitimate receivers from decoding these messages [14]. Many solutions were
proposed to enhance physical layer security including: (i) using protected zones in order to ensure
an eavesdropper-free regions around the transmitters [15], [16], (ii) using artificial noise in order
to degrade the confidential signal’s SNR at the energy receiver [9], [17], (iii) beamforming in
multi-antenna systems [10]–[12], and (iv) using guard zones to stop information transmission
whenever an eavesdropper is detected within a specific region around the transmitter [18], [19].
In this paper, we limit our attention to single-antenna transmitters and receivers, which means
beamforming is not applicable to our setup. In addition, using protected zones assumes some
physical control over the eavesdroppers, which will not be considered in this paper. Thus, we have
3two options to choose from: either use artificial noise or guard zones. In [20], it was recently
shown that the guard zone technique outperforms the artificial noise technique in the noise
limited regime when the link distance is higher than a specific threshold. No such performance
comparison between the two techniques is known when interference is taken into account.
Regardless, we focus on the guard zone technique in this paper while leaving the artificial
noise technique as a promising direction of future work. In particular, modeling the interaction
between a primary network using guard zones to enhance secrecy and an IoT network using RF
signals transmitted by the primary network to harvest energy is the main focus of this paper.
A. Related Work
In this subsection, we will provide a brief summary of the related works in three general
directions of interest to this paper: (i) stochastic geometry-based analysis of secrecy and/or
energy harvesting wireless networks, (ii) game theory-based analysis of secrecy and/or energy
harvesting wireless networks, and (iii) analysis of secure wireless power transmission.
Stochastic geometry-based work. Stochastic geometry has emerged as a powerful mathematical
tool for the modeling and analysis of variety of wireless networks [21]–[24]. Out of numerous
aspects of wireless networks that have been studied using stochastic geometry, two that are
most relevant to this paper are: (i) secrecy [18], [25], [26], and (ii) energy harvesting [27]–
[31]. We first discuss the related works on secrecy. The work presented in [18] quantified the
loss in network throughput that results from ensuring a specific level of secrecy performance.
In addition, possible performance enhancement using guard zones was also studied. Authors
in [25] studied the physical layer security of downlink cellular networks assuming that all the
existing users in the network are potential cooperating eavesdroppers. In [26], authors studied
the secrecy of downlink transmission when the transmitter adopts transmit antenna selection.
In particular, they derived the secrecy outage probability for the cases of independent and
cooperating eavesdroppers, considering both half and full duplex legitimate receivers.
Stochastic geometry has also been applied to analyze the performance of energy harvest-
ing cellular networks with emphasis on either the downlink channel [27]–[29] or the uplink
channel [30]. The work presented in [27] provided a comprehensive framework for analyzing
heterogeneous cellular networks with energy harvesting base stations (BSs). The primary focus
was on characterizing optimal transmission policies as well as quantifying the availability of
different tiers of BSs. In [28], [29], the joint analysis of the downlink signal quality and the
4amount of energy harvested at an RF-powered user was performed. In [30], [31], the uplink
counterpart of this problem was explored in which the RF-powered node first harvests energy
from ambient RF signals and then uses it to perform data transmission. The work presented
in [32] focused on the secrecy analysis of wireless networks where the legitimate transmitters
are powered by energy harvesting. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first
stochastic geometry-based secrecy analysis of wireless power transmission with energy receivers
acting as potential eavesdroppers. More details will be provided shortly.
Game theory-based work. Tools from game theory have been widely used in the analysis
of secrecy in wireless networks [33]–[36]. Using these tools, in [33] authors modeled the
interaction between cognitive networks and eavesdroppers, where a channel selection algorithm
was proposed to reach the Nash equilibrium. In [34], authors studied the problem of optimizing
the uplink path in multi-hop networks in order to maximize the secrecy rate. In [35], authors
used matching theory to develop an algorithm that enhances the secrecy of source-destination
pairs using jamming nodes. In [36], authors proposed a distributed algorithm that enhances the
achievable secrecy rates in wireless networks with cooperative wireless nodes.
These tools have also been used in the analysis of energy harvesting wireless networks. For
instance, authors in [37] provided different approaches to manage energy trading among energy
harvesting small cell BSs in order to minimize the consumption of non-renewable energy. Authors
in [38] used theses tools to model the relay interference channels where the relay divides the
received power from the source into two parts: (i) the first part is used to charge its own battery,
and (ii) the rest of the received power is used to forward the received packet to its destination.
In [39], these tools were used to determine optimal probability of switching from listen to active
modes and from sleep to active modes for a solar powered wireless sensor network.
Secure wireless power transmission. While the idea of having the energy receiver as a potential
eavesdropper has not been studied yet in the stochastic geometry literature (with randomly located
ERs and legitimate transmitters), recent works have explored this idea for the deterministic
system setups [7], [8], [40]–[42]. These works assume that the transmitter aims to maximize
secrecy performance with the constraint of providing ERs with the required wireless power.
In [7], [8], authors focused on a single point-to-point link with one ER (potential eavesdropper)
in the system. An artificial noise-based solution was proposed to improve secrecy without
reducing the amount of wireless power received by the ER. In [40], authors studied the use of a
friendly jammer to enhance the performance of the point-to-point system. The friendly jammer
5increases the amount of received power by the ER. In addition, it reduces the decodability of the
confidential message by the ER. The single link system was extended in [41] to consider one
multi-antenna transmitter, one legitimate receiver, and K ERs. Optimal beamforming schemes
were provided to either maximize secrecy subject to constraints on harvested energy by the ERs
or to maximize harvested energy by the ERs subject to secrecy constraints. Similar approach
was adopted in [42] for a more general system model of one macro BS serving M users, N
femto BSs each serving K users, and L ERs. Unlike all these works, we will model the locations
of ERs and legitimate transmitters using point processes, which will enable us to draw general
conclusions that will not be restricted to particular topologies.
In this paper, we study the secrecy performance of a primary network that consists of PTs and
information receivers (which will also be referred to as primary receivers or PRs), overlaid with
an IoT network that consists of RF-powered devices (energy receivers or ERs). Guard zones are
assumed to be present around PTs in order to improve secrecy. The only sources of ambient RF
signals for ERs are the PT transmissions. The PT transmits information (becomes active) to the
PRs only when the guard zone is free of ERs, otherwise it remains silent. On one hand, the IoT
network would prefer a dense deployment of ERs so as to increase the overall energy harvested
by the IoT network. However, on the other hand, more dense deployment of ERs will mean that
more PTs will stay silent (due to the higher likelihood of ERs lying in the guard zones of the
PTs) that will ultimately reduce the amount of ambient RF energy harvested, and hence degrade
energy harvesting performance. Modeling and analysis of this setup is the main focus of this
paper. We summarize the contributions of this paper next.
B. Contributions
Primary network performance analysis. Modeling the locations of PTs and ERs by two
independent Poisson point processes (PPPs), we show that the locations of active PTs (PTs
with ER-free guard zones) follow Poisson hole process. For this setup, we define the probability
of successful connection (Pcon) between the PT and its associated PR by the joint probability
of the PT being active and the SINR at the PR being above a predefined threshold. We derive
Pcon as a function of the density of ERs and the guard zone radius rg. We concretely derive
a threshold on the density of the PTs below which Pcon is a decreasing function of rg. Above
this threshold, we prove the existence of an optimal value of rg that maximizes Pcon. For the
secrecy analysis, we derive the probability of secure communication (defined by the probability
6of having the SINR value at any ER less than a predefined threshold). Referring to this metric
as Psec, we provide several useful insights on the effect of the PT transmission power as well
as the density of ERs on the value of Psec.
IoT network performance analysis. For the IoT network (secondary network), we derive the
probability of harvesting a minimum amount of energy Emin by the ERs. We define the density
of ERs that satisfy this condition as the density of successfully powered ERs. We prove the
existence of an optimal deployment density of ERs that maximizes this density of successfully
powered ERs. In order to capture the relation between this optimal density and the guard zone
radius, we derive a useful lower bound on the the density of successfully powered ERs. We show
that the optimal deployment density that maximizes this lower bound is a decreasing function
of rg. Although this conclusion is drawn using a lower bound, we use numerical results and
simulations to demonstrate that it holds for the exact expressions as well.
Modeling the interaction between the two networks. Building on the above results, we show
that the interaction between the two networks can be modeled using tools from game theory.
In particular, we show that this system can be modeled by a two player non-cooperative static
game. The first player is the primary network with the guard zone radius representing its strategy.
Its utility function is modeled to capture the successful connection probability as well as the
probability of secure communication. The second player is the IoT network with the deployment
density representing its strategy. Its utility function is modeled to capture the main performance
metric of this network, which is the density of successfully powered ERs. We propose a best
response-based learning algorithm that helps in achieving the Nash equilibrium of this game.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a system that is composed of two wireless networks: (i) a primary network,
and (ii) an IoT network (will be referred to as secondary network in the rest of this paper).
The primary network is constructed of PTs and primary receivers (will be referred to as either
PRs or legitimate receivers interchangeably throughout the paper). The locations of the PTs are
modeled by a homogeneous PPP ΦP ≡ {xi} ⊂ R2 with density λP . In order to enhance secrecy
performance, each PT is surrounded by a circular guard zone of radius rg centered at the PT. We
assume that each PT is able to detect the presence of any illegitimate receiver within its guard
zone [43]. Various detecting devices can be used for this purpose including metal detectors and
leaked local oscillator power detectors [15]. The benefits of using secrecy guard zones and their
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Fig. 1. The PT stops transmission (becomes silent) if any ER is detected within its guard zone.
effect on secrecy performance were discussed in [18]. As shown in Fig. 1, before the PT transmits
data to its associated PR, it scans the guard zone for any illegitimate receivers. If the guard zone
is clear, the PT transmits the confidential data, otherwise, the PT stops transmission (becomes
silent). The secondary network is constructed of RF-powered nodes that harvest RF energy from
the signals transmitted by the primary network. We refer to these nodes as energy receivers
(will be referred to as either ERs or eavesdroppers interchangeably throughout the paper). The
locations of the ERs are modeled by a homogeneous PPP ΦS ≡ {yi} ⊂ R2 with density λS .
From the primary network’s perspective, the ERs are considered illegitimate receivers. Hence,
applying the guard zone scheme, the PT stops transmission whenever at least one ER exists
within its guard zone. We assume that ERs are the only potential eavesdroppers in the system.
We focus our analysis on the typical PT whose intended PR is located at a given distance r1
from the PT. Drawing analogy from the Poisson bipolar model, we call this the typical link and
its constituent PT and PR as typical PT and typical PR, respectively. Note that this terminology
is indeed rigorous if we assume a Poisson bipolar model in which each PT has an associated
PR at a fixed distance. However, since the same setup can be used for cellular networks by
treating r1 as the conditional value of the serving distance, we leave the setup general. Overall,
the assumption of fixed r1 enables us to gain several useful insights. In particular, this enables
us to better understand how the rest of the system parameters (e.g. rg, λS , and PT’s transmission
power) affect the interaction between the two networks. Due to the stationarity of PPP, the
typical PR can be assumed to be located at the origin without loss of generality. The typical PT
is located at x1 at distance r1 = ‖x1‖ from the typical PR. In case the guard zone is clear of ERs,
the typical PT transmits the confidential message to the typical PT. In that case, the received
power at the typical PR is Pth1r−α1 , where Pt is the PT transmission power, h1 ∼ exp(1) models
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TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Notation Description
ΦP ; λP PPP modeling the locations of the PTs; density of the PTs
ΦS ; λS PPP modeling the locations of ERs; density of the ERs
EH Amount of energy harvested by ER (in Joules)
Pcon The probability of successful connection between a PT and its associated PR
Psec The probability of secure communication
Penergy The density of successfully powered ERs
h; g; w Fading gains for the link between the typical PR and an arbitrary PT; the typical PT and an arbitrary ER; an ER and its nearest active PT
rg; Re Guard zone radius; distance between a PT and its nearest ER
1(Ξ) An indicator function such that 1(Ξ) = 1 if the condition Ξ is satisfied and equals zero otherwise
Pt; σ2P ; σ
2
S PT transmission power; noise power at the PR; noise power at the ER
; α Minimum required value for Psec; path loss exponent (α > 2)
βP ; βS Minimum required SINR value at the PR to ensure successful connection; threshold on SINR at ERs to ensure perfect secrecy
Rayleigh fading gain, and r−α1 models power law path-loss with exponent α > 2.
A. Primary Network Modeling
According to Wyner’s encoding scheme [14], [44] and the approach used in [18], the PT
defines the rate of codewords and the rate of confidential messages, Ct and Cs respectively.
The difference, Ce = Ct − Cs, can be interpreted as the cost paid to secure the confidential
messages. Let the mutual information between PT’s channel input and PR’s channel output be
It and between PT’s channel input and ER’s channel output be Ie. Then, the objective is to
ensure that the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) Ct ≤ It to ensure successful decoding
at the PR, and (ii) Ce ≥ Ie to ensure perfect secrecy. Equivalently, we can define two SINR
thresholds at the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper. To ensure successful decoding of
the received confidential message at the PR, the condition SINRP ≥ βP should be satisfied,
where βP = 2Ct − 1. Similarly, to ensure perfect secrecy, the SINR at any eavesdropper should
satisfy the condition SINRS ≥ βS , where βS = 2Ct−Cs−1. In order to mathematically define the
instantaneous value of SINR at the legitimate receiver, we need to capture the effect of adopting
the guard zone scheme on the interference level at the typical PR. According to the guard zone
scheme, an interfering PT located at xi is active only if its guard zone is clear of ERs. Hence,
denoting the random variable representing the distance between the typical PT and its nearest
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Fig. 2. The locations of active PTs is modeled by a PHP where the locations of ERs represent the centers of the holes.
eavesdropper by Re, the probability of a typical PT being active is
Pactive = P(Re ≥ rg) = e−λSpirg2 . (1)
Next, we formally define the value of SINR at the typical PR as
SINRP =
Pth1r
−α
1∑
xi∈ΦP \x1 δiPthi‖xi‖−α + σ2P
, (2)
where hi ∼ exp(1) models Rayleigh fading gain for the link between the typical PR and the PT
located at xi, and σ2P is the noise power at the PRs. The indicator function δi is used to capture
only the active interfering nodes. Hence, δi = 1 if the PT located at xi is active and equals zero
otherwise. The expected value of δi is E[δi] = Pacitve.
The locations of the active PTs can be modeled using Poisson hole process (PHP) Ψ [45],
[46]. A PHP is constructed using two independent PPPs: (i) Baseline PPP Φ1, and (ii) the PPP
modeling the locations of the hole centers Φ2. All points of Φ1 that are within distance D from
any point in Φ2 are carved out. The remaining points of Φ1 represent the PHP. In our system, as
shown in Fig. 2, we can use the same approach to model the locations of the active PTs. Any
PT in ΦP that is within a distance rg from any ER in ΦS is inactive. Hence, the locations of
the remaining (active) PTs are modeled by PHP. This can be formally defined as follows
Ψ =
{
x ∈ ΦP : x /∈
⋃
y∈ΦS
B(y, rg)
}
, (3)
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where B(y, rg) is a ball of radius rg centered at y. Since the probability of retention of any point
in ΦP is Pactive, the density of the resulting PHP Ψ is λPPacitve.
The primary network tries to jointly optimize two main performance metrics: (i) successful
connection probability, and (ii) secure communication probability. While the former is related
to the successful delivery of the data from the PT to the PR, the latter is related to the security
of the transmitted data when the PT is active. Both metrics are formally defined below.
Definition 1 (Probability of successful connection). In order to ensure successful connection
between the typical PT and PR, two conditions need to be satisfied: (i) the typical PT is active,
and (ii) the SINR at the typical PR is greater than the threshold βP . Therefore, the probability
of successful connection is
Pcon(rg, λS) = P(Re ≥ rg, SINRP ≥ βP ). (4)
When a PT is transmitting confidential data (active PT), the condition of SINRS ≤ βS needs
to be satisfied at each ER in order to ensure perfect secrecy. Focusing on the signal transmitted
by the typical PT, the SINR value at an ER located at yj is
SINRS(yj) =
Ptg1,j‖x1 − yj‖−α∑
xi∈ΦP \x1 δiPtgi,j‖xi − yj‖−α + σ2S
, (5)
where gi,j ∼ exp(1) models Rayleigh fading gain for the link between the PT located at xi
and the ER located at yj , and σ2S is the noise power at the ERs. We now define the second
performance metric for the primary network, the secure communication probability, next.
Definition 2 (Secure communication probability). Given that a PT is active, the probability that
its transmitted data is perfectly secured is
Psec(rg, λS) = E
1
 ⋃
yj∈ΦS
SINRS(yj) ≤ βS
∣∣∣∣∣Re ≥ rg
 . (6)
For a given value of λS , the primary network selects the value of rg = r∗g that maximizes the
value of Pcon while ensuring Psec ≥ , where 0 <  ≤ 1. The selection of r∗g is mathematically
formulated next.
Definition 3 (Guard zone radius selection). The primary network selects the guard zone radius
r∗g that satisfies the following
r∗g = arg max
rg∈G(λS)
Pcon(rg, λS),
11
G(λS) = {rg : Psec(rg, λS) ≥ }. (7)
Remark 1. By observing Eq. 7, we note that the value of r∗g selected by the primary network
is a function of the density of the secondary network λS . In addition, while Pactive is obviously
a decreasing function of rg, the exact effect of rg on either Pcon or Psec is harder to describe
than one expects. It might seem intuitive to expect that as rg increases the average distance
between any PT and its nearest ER will increase, leading to an increase in the probability of
secure communication. However, this is actually not always correct. The reason for that is the
effect of rg on the density of the PHP Ψ, λPPacitve, which is the density of active interferers.
As the guard zone radius increases, the density of interferers decreases, which means that the
interference level at any ER will decrease on average leading to a larger SINR value.
To better understand the behavior of all the aforementioned performance metrics, we will
derive some insightful expressions that will, with the help of the numerical results, provide a
complete picture for the effect of the system parameters on these metrics.
B. Secondary Network Modeling
For an ambient RF energy harvesting device, the distance to the nearest source is critical and
has major effect on the average harvested energy value, as shown in [29]. The energy harvested
from the nearest source is frequently used in the literature to study the performance of ambient
RF energy harvesting wireless devices. For instance, in [47], authors proposed the concept of
harvesting zone where an ER is able to activate its power conversion circuit and harvest energy
only if it is within a specific distance from the active PT. Consequently, we focus our analysis of
the energy harvested from the nearest PT since it is the dominant source of ambient RF energy.
Hence, the energy harvested by the ER located at yj is
EH = ηTPt‖xj,1 − yj‖−αwj, (8)
where η models the RF-DC efficiency of the ER, T is the duration of the transmission slot
(assumed to be unity in the rest of the paper), xj,1 is the location of the nearest active PT to
the ER located at yj , and wj ∼ exp(1) models Rayleigh fading gain for the link between the
ER located at yj and its nearest active PT. Most of the relevant existing works use one of two
performance metrics for the anlysis of energy harvesting wireless networks: (i) the expected
value of the harvested energy E[EH ] as in [31], or (ii) the energy coverage probability P(EH ≥
12
Emin) as in [30], where Emin is the minimum required value of EH at each ER. We will use a
modified version of the latter metric. In order to maximize the density of ERs that harvest the
minimum amount of energy Emin, the secondary network selects the network density λS = λ∗S
that maximizes
Penergy = λSP(EH ≥ Emin). (9)
The above metric represents the density of the successfully powered ERs.
Remark 2. Note that the distance between an ER and its nearest active PT increases, on
average, as the density of active PTs, λPPacitve, decreases. Recalling, from Eq. 1, that Pactive
is a decreasing function of both rg and λS , we can expect P(EH ≥ Emin) to be a decreasing
function of both rg and λS . This implies two things: (i) the performance metric defined in Eq. 9
has a local maximum at λS = λ∗S , and (ii) the value of the selected density λ
∗
S that maximizes
Eq. 9 is a function of rg.
From Remarks 1 and 2 we can get some initial observations on the coupling between the
two networks. To better understand the relation between the parameters selected by each of the
networks (rg for the primary network, and λS for the secondary network), we first need to derive
an expression for each of Pcon and Psec for the primary network, and Penergy for the secondary
network.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Primary Network
1) Probability of Successful Connection: As stated earlier, for a given value of λS , the primary
network selects the optimal guard zone radius r∗g that maximizes Pcon while ensuring that Psec ≥
. The process of rg selection was mathematically formulated in Definition 3. In the following
Theorem we derive Pcon.
Theorem 1 (Probability of successful connection). For a given value of λS , the probability of
successful connection defined in Definition 1 is
Pcon(rg, λS) = exp
(
−
[
λSpir
2
g + βP
σ2P
Pt
rα1 +
2pi2λPPactiveβ
2
α
P r
2
1
α sin( 2
α
pi)
])
. (10)
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Remark 3. According to Definition 1 of Pcon, the effect of rg on Pcon is two fold. On one hand,
increasing the value of rg decreases the probability of the PT being active, which decreases Pcon.
This effect appears in the first term in the exponent in Eq. 10. On the other hand, increasing
the value of rg decreases the density of active interferers. Hence, the probability of having SINR
higher than βP increases, which increases Pcon. This effect appears in the third term in the
exponent in Eq. 10 implicitly in the value of Pactive.
To better understand the effect of rg on Pcon, we derive the value of rˆg that maximizes Pcon
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2. Defining A1 = 2pi
2λP β
2
α
P r
2
1
α sin( 2
α
pi)
then:
• If A1 ≤ 1, then Pcon is a decreasing function of rg, and rˆg = 0.
• If A1 > 1, then rˆg =
√
ln(A1)
piλS
.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 4. From the above Theorem, we conclude that when A1 ≤ 1 the effect of rg on
the density of active interferers is negligible. This is consistent with intuition. Observing the
expression of A1 in Theorem 2, we note that it is an increasing function of λP , βP , and r1.
Hence, A1 ≤ 1 results from one or more of the following conditions: (i) λP is too small to
take the effect of interference into consideration (the system is noise limited), (ii) r1 is too small
such that the received signal power from the intended PT is hardly attenuated by the path-loss,
and (iii) βP is a very relaxed threshold. These three consequences of having A1 ≤ 1 make the
condition of Re ≥ rg in Definition 1 of Pcon dominate the other condition of SINRP ≥ βP . This
eventually makes Pcon a decreasing function of rg, similar to P(Re ≥ rg).
In the following corollary, an upper bound on the value of Pcon(r∗g , λS) is provided.
Corollary 1. Using the result in Theorem 2, the value of Pcon(r∗g , λS) is upper bounded as
follows
Pcon(r
∗
g , λS) ≤ Pcon
√ ln (max{A1, 1})
piλS
, λS
 , (11)
where A1 is defined in Theorem 2.
14
Proof: The proof follows by observing that rˆg is the value of rg that maximizes Pcon without
any constraints, while r∗g is the value of rg that maximizes Pcon with the constraint of rg ∈ G(λS),
as explained in Definition 3.
2) Secure Communication Probability: The secure communication probability, formally de-
fined in Definition 2, is derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Secure communication probability). For a given value of rg and λS , the probability
of secure communication is
Psec(rg, λS) = exp
(
−2piλS
∫ ∞
rg
exp
(
−σ
2
SβSr
α
y
Pt
)
LI2(βSrαy )rydry
)
, (12)
where LI2(s) = exp
(
−2piλPPactive
∫ sr−αg
0
s
2
α
α(1+z)z
2
α
dz
)
.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 5. The intuitive observations provided in Remark 1 can now be verified using Theorem 3.
For instance, the effect of rg on the distance between the PT and its nearest ER is captured
in the integration limits in the above equation. Obviously, as we increase rg, the integration
interval will decrease, which increases the value of Psec. On the other hand, the effect of rg on
the density of active interferers at the ER is captured in the term LI2(βSrαx ). As we mentioned
earlier, increasing the value of rg decreases the interference levels at the ER, which increases
the value of SINRS, which eventually reduces Psec. This is verified here by observing that LI2(s)
is an increasing function of rg.
Due to the complexity of the expression provided in Theorem 3 for Psec, it is not straightfor-
ward to derive expressions for either G(λS) or r∗g . However, using the results for Pcon and Psec
in Theorems 1 and 3, it is easy to compute r∗g numerically. In order to better understand the
behavior of the system, we will provide expressions for Pcon and Psec in both noise-limited as
well as interference-limited regimes. In the discussion section, results for both regimes will be
compared with the results of the system at different values of rg resulting in several meaningful
insights. In the case of a noise limited regime, the interference terms in the expressions of both
Pcon and Psec will be removed leading to the following corollary.
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Corollary 2. In the noise limited regime, Pcon will be a decreasing function of rg, while Psec
will be an increasing function of rg as follows
PNoise limitedcon = exp
(
−
[
λSpir
2
g + βP
σ2P
Pt
rα1
])
, (13)
PNoise limitedsec = exp
(
−2piλS
∫ ∞
rg
exp
(
−σ
2
SβSr
α
y
Pt
)
rydry
)
= exp
(
−2piλS
α
(
Pt
σ2SβS
) 2
α
Γ
(
2
α
,
rαg βSσ
2
S
Pt
))
. (14)
And the value of r∗g is presented by the following equation
Γ
(
2
α
,
(r∗g)
αβSσ
2
S
Pt
)
= min
 αLn
(
1

)
2piλS
(
Pt
σ2SβS
) 2
α
,Γ
(
2
α
) . (15)
Proof: Eq. 13 and 14 follow directly by removing the interference terms from the results in
Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. Since PNoise limitedcon is a decreasing function of rg, and P
Noise limited
sec
is an increasing function of rg, the primary network picks the minimum value of rg that satisfies
the condition Psec ≥ . Substituting for Psec using Eq. 14 in the inequality Psec ≥  leads to
Eq. 15.
In the case of an interference-limited regime, the noise terms in the expressions of both Pcon
and Psec will be ignored leading to the following corollary.
Corollary 3. In the interference limited regime, expressions for Pcon and Psec are provided below.
P Int. limitedcon = exp
(
−
[
λSpir
2
g +
2pi2λPPactiveβ
2
α
P r
2
1
α sin( 2
α
pi)
])
, (16)
P Int. limitedsec = exp
(
−2piλS
∫ ∞
rg
LI2(βSrαx )rxdrx
)
. (17)
Proof: These results follow by substituting for σ2P = σ
2
S = 0 in Theorems 1 and 3.
The main take-away from this subsection is that each of Pcon and Psec are functions of λS ,
which consequently implies that r∗g is a function of λS . In the next subsection, we will show
that optimal density λ∗S selected by the secondary network is also a function of rg.
B. Secondary Network
The objective of the secondary network is to maximize the density of successfully powered
ERs Penergy, introduced in Eq. 9, which is derived in the following Theorem.
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Theorem 4 (Density of successfully powered ERs). For a given value of rg and λS , the density
of successfully powered ERs is
Penergy(rg, λS) = λS
∫ ∞
rg
2piλPPactiverp exp
(
−piλPPactive(r2p − r2g)−
Eminr
α
p
Ptη
)
drp. (18)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The above equation is a product of two terms: (i) the density of ERs λS , and (ii) the integral
term, which is the expression derived for the probability P(EH ≥ Emin). Consequently, we can
claim the existence of an optimal value of λS that maximizes the density of successfully powered
ERs Penergy. The reason behind that is the dependence of the density of active sources of RF
energy (active PTs) on the density of ERs. This interesting trade-off arises due to the use of
secrecy guard zones by the primary network. Obviously, the value of Penergy is a function of rg.
Hence, the value of λ∗S , that maximizes Penergy, is also a function of rg. Unfortunately, λ
∗
S can
not be computed from the above expression due to its complexity. Hence, to get more insights
on the relation between λ∗S and rg, we derive a lower bound on Penergy in the following corollary.
We use this lower bound to compute λ∗S as a function of rg.
Corollary 4. The value of Penergy is lower bounded as follows
Penergy ≥ λS
∫ ∞
rg
2piλPPactiverp exp
(
−piλP (r2p − r2g)−
Eminr
α
p
Ptη
)
drp. (19)
The value of λS that maximizes the lower bound is
λ∗S =
1
pir2g
. (20)
Proof: The lower bound follows by simply replacing Pactive inside the exponent in Eq. 18
with unity. The value of λ∗S follows by differentiating Eq. 19 with respect to λS .
Remark 6. It can be noted from Eq. 20 that the value of λ∗S is a decreasing function of rg.
This agrees with intuition since when the value of rg increases, the secondary network needs to
decrease λS in order to maintain the density of active PTs, which are the sources of RF energy.
The mutual coupling between r∗g and λS as well as λ
∗
S and rg can be best modeled using tools
from game theory. This will be the core of the next section.
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IV. GAME THEORETICAL MODELING
Building on all the insights and comments given in the previous section, we can model the
interaction between the two networks using tools from game theory. For a given value of λS ,
the primary network selects r∗g as presented in Definition 3, which can be rewritten as
r∗g = arg max
rg≥0
Pcon(rg, λS)1(Psec(rg, λS) ≥ ), (21)
where 1(Ξ) = 1 if the condition Ξ is satisfied, and equals zero otherwise. On the other hand,
for a given value of rg, the secondary network selects λ∗S as follows
λ∗S = arg max
λS≥0
Penergy(rg, λS). (22)
Observing Eq. 21 and 22, it is fairly straightforward to see that the system setup can be modeled
as a non-cooperative static game with two players: (i) the primary network is player 1, and (ii)
the secondary network is player 2. The utility function of player 1 is
U1(rg, λS) = Pcon(rg, λS)1(Psec(rg, λS) ≥ ), (23)
while the utility function of player 2 is
U2(rg, λS) = Penergy(rg, λS). (24)
For this game, the main objective is to find the values of r∗g and λ
∗
S where each of the two networks
has no tendency to change its tuning parameter. This is the definition of Nash equilibrium (NE).
This can be mathematically modeled as
r∗g = arg max
rg≥0
Pcon(rg, λ
∗
S)1(Psec(rg, λ
∗
S) ≥ ),
λ∗S = arg max
λS≥0
Penergy(r
∗
g , λS). (25)
Unfortunately, due to the complexity of the expressions of Pcon in Theorem 1 and Psec in
Theorem 3, it is challenging to provide a closed-form solution for NE. However, based on the
comments given in Remark 2 and the result in Theorem 2, we provide a learning algorithm that
assists both networks to find NE.
The proposed learning algorithm is a simple best-response based algorithm [48]–[50]. In each
iteration, each network updates its parameters according to the opponent’s network parameter in
the previous iteration. This can be mathematically presented as follows:
r(n)g = r
∗
g
(
λ
(n−1)
S
)
,
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λ
(n)
S = λ
∗
S
(
r(n−1)g
)
, (26)
where r(n)g and λ
(n)
S are the outputs of the algorithm in the n-th iteration, r
∗
g
(
λ
(n−1)
S
)
is computed
using Eq. 21 for λS = λ
(n−1)
S , and λ
∗
S
(
r
(n−1)
g
)
is computed using Eq. 22 for rg = r
(n−1)
g .
Assuming that the secondary network has a maximum possible deployment density, λS ≤ λS,max,
the algorithm is provided next.
Algorithm: Proposed algorithm for finding the NE network parameters r∗g
and λ∗S
input: λP , λS,max, βP , βS , Pt, α, η, and Emin.
output: r∗g , λ∗S .
Initialization: r(0)g = 0 for all PTs in ΦP, λ
(0)
S = λS,max, n = 1
1: Repeat
2: r(n)g = r∗g
(
λ
(n−1)
S
)
3: λ(n)S = λ
∗
S
(
r
(n−1)
g
)
4: n = n+ 1
5: Until r(n)g = r(n−1)g & λ(n)S = λ
(n−1)
S
Note that we assume the ability of each network to estimate perfectly the opponent’s action
in the previous iteration. Including the possibility of the estimation error and its effect on
convergence is left as a promising direction of future work. In the next section, we will show
using simulations the convergence of the proposed algorithm to the NE of the modeled game.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we will use both theoretical and simulation results (obtained from Monte-Carlo
trials) to analyze the performance of both primary and secondary networks. The values of the
system parameters used for the simulation setup are: λP = 1, η = 0.75, Emin = 10−4 Joules,
α = 4, λS,max = 2, Pt = 1, βP = 3 dB, βS = 0 dB, r1 = 0.1, and  = 0.8. The values of the
rest of the parameters will be defined either on the figures or in their captions. We also refer to
the SNR values at the primary and secondary receivers as γP = Ptσ2S and γS =
Pt
σ2S
respectively.
In addition, we define the ratio of λS to its maximum value by δS = λSλS,max . Our main goals
in this section are: (i) to validate the approximations used in our derivations, (ii) to get further
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Fig. 3. The effect of λS on the behavior of Pcon against different values of rg . The SNR value at the legitimate receiver is
γP = 7 dB.
insights on the behavior of both the networks, and (iii) to verify the comments provided in
the Remarks throughout the paper. We first study the successful connection probability Pcon in
Fig. 3. First note that the simulation parameters chosen above are such that we get A1 < 1,
where A1 is defined in Theorem 2. The results in Fig. 3 show that increasing the density of
ERs decreases Pcon. Although increasing λS decreases the density of active interferers (which
should increase Pcon), it also decreases the probability of the PT being active (which decreases
Pcon). Ultimately, for this setup, Pcon is a decreasing function of λS because of having A1 < 1.
As explained in Remark 4, A1 < 1 leads to a noise limited system from the perspective of the
successful connection probability, which means that the effect of λS on the density of active
interferers is negligible compared to its effect on the probability of the PT being active. Further,
note that because of having A1 < 1, Pcon is also a decreasing function of rg. As a result, r∗g
will be the minimum value of rg that ensures Psec ≥ . The value of Psec as a function of rg is
plotted in Fig. 4 for different values of γS . Consistent with the intuition, increasing γS decreases
Psec. We also note that at low values of rg the effect of γS is hardly noticeable, while at higher
values of rg, the effect of γS becomes significant. Furthermore, we note that r∗g is an increasing
function of γS . To better understand the effect of γS on the behavior of Psec, we plot in Fig. 5 the
value of Psec for both the noise limited and the interference limited regimes, which are derived
in Corollary 2 and 3, respectively. These results lead to the following key insights:
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• At lower values of rg, the density of active interferers is relatively high. Hence, we observe
that from the secure communication probability perspective, the system is interference
limited in this regime. Furthermore, increasing the SNR value γS has a negligible effect.
This is a direct consequence of being in the interference-limited regime.
• At higher values of rg, the density of active interferers decreases, which drives the system
to the noise limited regime. As a result, the noise power has more noticeable effect on Psec.
Equivalently, increasing value of γS decreases the value of Psec at higher values of rg.
• Obviously, P Int. Limitedsec is a decreasing function of rg, while P
Noise Limited
sec is an increasing
function of rg. However, the behavior of Psec is harder to describe. We note the existence
of a local minimum of Psec below which it behaves more like P Int. Limitedsec , whereas above
this local minimum, Psec behaves similar to PNoise Limitedsec .
In Fig. 6, we study the effect of λS on the behavior of Psec against different values of rg. We
note that r∗g increases with λS . We also note that, unlike γS , the effect of λS is more prominent
at the lower values of rg. As explained above, the reason is that the system is interference
limited at lower values of rg, where increasing λS decreases the density of interferers, which in
turn decreases P Int. Limitedsec . We plot Psec, P
Int. Limited
sec , and P
Noise Limited
sec in Fig. 7 to verify these
arguments. We also note that at higher values of rg, as we stated earlier, the system is noise
limited, where λS has less effect on PNoise Limitedsec compared to P
Int. Limited
sec . This can be verified
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from Fig. 6 by observing that the gaps between the Psec curves for different values of λS get
tighter as rg increases.
Now that we have better understanding of the behavior of Pcon and Psec, we study the energy
harvesting performance of the secondary network. In Fig. 8, we illustrate the behavior of Penergy
against λS for different values of rg. We note that at lower values of rg, the optimal value of
λS is its maximum value λS,max. This is consistent with intuition that at lower values of rg, the
density of active PTs (sources of RF energy) will hardly get affected by increasing λS . As rg
increases, the impact of λS on the density of active PTs becomes noticeable. As shown in Fig. 8,
this eventually leads to the existence of a local maximum of Penergy. We also note that as the
value of rg increases, the optimal value λ∗S decreases. This is also consistent with our comments
in Remark 6 that as rg increases, the secondary network needs to decrease its density in order
to maintain the density of active PTs that provide the RF energy to the ERs.
Taking a second look at Figs. 6 and 8, we can easily verify our earlier comments that
the parameters selected by each of the networks (rg for the primary network and λS for the
secondary network) affect the value of the optimal parameter of the other network. Using the
procedure provided in Sec. IV, we simulate the interaction between both networks by simulating
the relations between r∗g and δS as well as δ
∗
S and rg, where δS =
λS
λS,max
is the normalized value
of the density of ERs. In Fig. 9, we plot r∗g (on the y-axis) for different values of δS (on the
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x-axis). On the same figure, we plot δ∗S (on the x-axis) for different values of rg (on the y-axis).
The intersection of both curves represents the value of NE where each of the two networks
has no intention to deviate as explained in Eq. 25. In Fig. 10, we evaluate the performance of
the algorithm proposed in Sec. IV. The results demonstrate the convergence of the proposed
algorithm to the NE found from Fig. 9 after less than 13 iterations.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of IoT regime is characterized by the deployment of billions of devices some
of which may be equipped with energy harvesting capability. Due to the ubiquity of RF signals,
harvesting energy from the ambient RF signals is perhaps the most attractive option for such
devices. This raises the possibility of some of these devices acting as eavesdroppers, which
motivates the need to study secure wireless power transfer to energy receivers acting as potential
eavesdroppers. While this problem received some attention in the literature, the existing works
are limited to simple point-to-point or simple deterministic topologies, which are not sufficient
to accurately model the massive scale of IoT. In this paper, we developed the first comprehensive
stochastic geometry-based model to study the performance of an ambient RF energy harvesting
network (secondary network) when the sources of RF signals are transmitters with secrecy guard
zones (primary network). First, using tools from stochastic geometry, we derived the successful
connection and secure communication probabilities of the primary network. Next, we derived the
density of successfully powered nodes in the secondary network. Furthermore, we showed that the
performance metrics of the two networks are coupled. In particular, we showed that the optimal
guard zone radius (that maximizes the successful connection probability while maintaining the
secure communication probability above a predefined threshold) is a function of the deployment
density of the secondary network. In addition, we showed that the optimal deployment density of
the secondary network (that maximizes the density of successfully powered nodes) is a function
of the guard zone radius of the primary network. Hence, we used tools from game theory to model
this interesting coupling between the two networks. In particular, we showed that such system
can be modeled as a two player non-cooperative game. In addition, we proposed a best-response
based algorithm and demonstrated with simulations its convergence to Nash equilibrium.
This paper is one of the few concrete works that symbiotically merge tools from stochastic
geometry and game theory. It can be extended in many directions. From the secrecy perspective,
it will be useful to extend the proposed model to incorporate other secrecy enhancing techniques,
such as beamforming and artificial noise technique. From the modeling perspective, it is worth-
while to investigate other meaningful morphologies, such as the one in which ERs are clustered
around the RF sources. From game theory perspective, it will be interesting to consider the effect
of imperfect estimation of the opponent’s action on the performance of the proposed algorithm.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Recalling the expression for SINRP given in Eq. 2, specifically the indicator function δi that
indicates which interferer is active and which is silent, we concluded that the locations of active
PTs can be modeled by PHP Ψ in Eq. 3. However, before using Ψ in our analysis, we need to
make it clear that δi for different xi ∈ ΦP are correlated. This implicit correlation arises from
the dependence of δi for all i on the PPP ΦS . However, capturing this correlation in our analysis
will significantly reduce the tractability of the results. Hence, this correlation will be ignored in
our analysis for the sake of tractability. The tightness of this approximation will be verified in
the Numerical Results section. Now revisiting the expression of Pcon in Eq. 4, we note that the
correlation between δ1 at the typical PT and δi values at each of the interferers in the expression
of SINRP is the only source of correlation between the events (Re ≥ rg) and (SINRP ≥ βP ).
Hence, ignoring this correlation will lead to the following
Pcon = P(Re ≥ rg)P(SINRP ≥ βP ). (27)
The first term in the above expression represents Pactive = exp
(−piλSr2g) (please recall Eq. 1
where Pactive was derived). To derive the second term in the above expression, characterizing
the statistics of the interference from a PHP modeled network at a randomly located reference
point (the typical PR) is required. However, ignoring the correlation between {δi}, for the sake
of tractability as explained above, is equivalent to approximating the PHP Ψ with a PPP ΨP of
equivalent density λ˜P = λPPactive. Defining I =
∑
xi∈ΨP hi‖xi‖−α, then
P(SINRP ≥ βP ) = P
(
h1r
−α
1
I +
σ2P
Pt
≥ βP
)
(a)
= EI
[
exp
(
−βP
(
I +
σ2P
Pt
)
rα1
)]
= exp
(
−βP σ
2
P
Pt
rα1
)
EI [exp (−βP Irα1 )]
(b)
= exp
(
−βP σ
2
P
Pt
rα1
)
LI (βP rα1 ) , (28)
where h1 ∼ exp(1) leads to step (a), and in step (b) we use the definition of Laplace transform
of I which is LI(s) = E [exp (−sI)]. The Laplace transform of the interference in PPP is a well
established result in the literature [23]. For completeness, the derivation of LI(s) is provided
next.
LI(s) = EΨP ,{hi}
[
exp
(
−s
∑
xi∈ΨP
hi‖xi‖−α
)]
= EΨP ,{hi}
[ ∏
xi∈ΨP
exp
(−shi‖xi‖−α)]
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(c)
= EΨP
[ ∏
xi∈ΨP
1
1 + s‖xi‖−α
]
(d)
= exp
(
−λ˜P
∫
x∈R2
1− 1
1 + s‖x‖−αdx
)
(e)
= exp
(
−2piλ˜P
∫ ∞
0
sr−αx
1 + sr−αx
rxdrx
)
(f)
= exp
(
−2pi
2λ˜P s
2
α csc
(
2pi
α
)
α
)
, (29)
where knowing that the set of fading gains hi are i.i.d with hi ∼ exp(1) leads to step (c), step (d)
results from using the probability generating function (PGFL) of PPP [24], step (e) results from
converting to polar co-ordinates, and step (f) follows after some mathematical manipulations.
Substituting Eq. 29 in Eq. 28 and then in Eq. 27 leads to the final result in Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Observing the expression of Pcon in Theorem 1, we note that it can be rewritten as a function
of Pactive = exp(−λSpir2g) as follows
Pcon = exp
(
−βP σ
2
P
Pt
rα1
)
Pactive exp (−PactiveA1) , (30)
where A1 = 2pi
2λP β
2
α
P r
2
1
α sin( 2
α
pi)
. To get more information about the behavior of Pcon against Pactive, we
compute the first derivative (with respect to Pactive). Given that Pactive is a decreasing function
of rg (recall Eq. 1), we conclude the following
1) If 1−A1Pactive ≥ 0, then Pcon is a decreasing function of rg,
2) If 1−A1Pactive ≤ 0, then Pcon is an increasing function of rg.
Consequently, we can infer that, since 0 ≤ Pacitve ≤ 1, Pcon is a decreasing function of rg as
long as A1 ≤ 1. In the case of A1 ≥ 1, the relation between Pcon and rg can be explained as
follows: (i) Pcon is an increasing function of rg as long as Pactive ≥ 1A1 (or rg ≤
√
ln(A1)
λSpi
), and
(ii) Pcon is a decreasing function of rg as long as Pactive ≤ 1A1 (or rg ≥
√
ln(A1)
λSpi
). This concludes
the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From Definition 2 of Psec, we observe that we need to jointly analyze the values of SINRS(yj)
at all the locations yj ∈ ΦS . Despite the usual assumption throughout most of the stochastic
geometry-based literature on secrecy analysis that these values are uncorrelated, this is actually
not precise. The reason for that is the dependence of SINRS(yj), by definition, on the PPP
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ΦP for all yj ∈ ΦS . Some recent works started working on characterizing the correlation
between intereference levels at different locations [51]. However, most of these works focus on
characterizing the correlation between only two locations assuming the knowledge of the distance
between them. Unfortunately, these results will not be useful for our analysis. Hence, aligning
with the existing literature, we will ignore this correlation in our analysis with the knowledge
that this will provide an approximation. Furthermore, the accuracy of this approximation is
expected to get worse as the value of λS increases. This is due to the fact that the distances
between ERs decrease as λS increases, which was shown in [51] to increase the correlation.
For notational simplicity, and without any loss of generality due to the stationarity of PPP, we
will assume that the typical PT is placed at the origin, i.e. x1 = o, in the rest of this proof.
All the analysis provided in this section is conditioned on the event Re ≥ rg. Following the
same approach as in Appendix A of approximating the PHP Ψ with a PPP ΨP , and defining
I2(yj) =
∑
xi∈ΨP \x1 gi,j‖xi − yj‖−α, Psec can be derived as follows
Psec = EΦS ,I2,{g1,j}
1
 ⋃
yj∈ΦS
g1,j‖yj‖−α
I2(yj) +
σ2S
Pt
≤ βS
 (g)= EΦS ,I2,{g1,j}
 ∏
yj∈ΦS
1
(
g1,j‖yj‖−α
I2(yj) +
σ2S
Pt
≤ βS
)
(h)
= EΦS ,I2
 ∏
yj∈ΦS
1− exp
−βS
(
I2(yj) +
σ2S
Pt
)
‖yj‖−α

(i)
= EΦS
 ∏
yj∈ΦS
1− exp
−βS
(
σ2S
Pt
)
‖yj‖−α
E [exp(−βSI2(yj)‖yj‖−α
)] , (31)
where step (g) (and step (i)) follow from assuming that the values of SINRS(yj) (and I2(yj))
are uncorrelated, as we discussed earlier in this Appendix. Step (h) is due to assuming the set
of fading gains {g1,j} to be i.i.d with g1,j ∼ exp(1). Defining the Laplace transform of I2(yj)
by LI2(yj)(s) = E[exp(−sI2(yj))], we note that there is only one difference in the derivation of
LI2(yj)(s) compared to that of LI(s) in Eq. 29. The difference is in the reference point from
where we are observing the interference. In Appendix A, the reference point was the PR, which
does not have a minimum distance from any active interfering PT. In the current derivation, the
reference point is an ER, which has a minimum distance of rg from any active interfering PT.
Hence, the derivation of LI2(yj)(s) will be exactly the same as in Eq. 29 until step (e), where
the minimum distance effect will appear in the lower limit of the integral as follows
LI2(yj)(s) = exp
(
−2piλ˜P
∫ ∞
rg
sr−αx
1 + sr−αx
rxdrx
)
. (32)
27
Note that the above expression is not a function of yj , so we drop it from the notation of
Laplace transform. The final expression for LI2(s) as provided in Theorem 3 follows after
simple mathematical manipulations. Substituting Eq. 32 in Eq. 31, we get
Psec = EΦS
 ∏
yj∈ΦS
(
1− exp
(
−βS
(
σ2S
Pt
)
‖yj‖α
)
LI2 (βS‖yj‖α)
)
(k)
= exp
(
−2piλS
∫
y∈R2∩B(o,rg)
exp
(
−βS
(
σ2S
Pt
)
‖y‖α
)
LI2 (βS‖y‖α) dy
)
, (33)
where step (k) results from applying PGFL of PPP, and the integration is over y ∈ R2∩B(o, rg)
because the analysis in this section is conditioned on the event Re ≥ rg, which means that
the typical PT is active. Since we assumed that the typical PT is placed at the origin in this
derivation, the ball B(o, rg) is clear of ERs. Converting from Cartesian to polar co-ordinates
leads to the final result in Theorem 3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The density of successfully powered ERs can be derived as follows
Penergy = λSP
(
ηPtR
−α
p w ≥ Emin
) (l)
= ERp
[
exp
(
−EminR
α
p
ηPt
)]
, (34)
where Rp is the distance between the ER and its nearest active PT, and step (l) is due to
w ∼ exp(1). The distance Rp represents the contact distance of a PHP observed from a hole
center. Unfortunately, the exact distribution of this distance is unknown. However, the approach
of approximating the PHP Ψ with a PPP ΨP is known to provide fairly tight approximation of
the contact distance distribution of PHP [52]. Given that the nearest active PT to the ER is at a
distance of at least rg, the distribution of Rp is
fRp(rp) = 2piλ˜P exp
(
−piλ˜P (rp − rg)2
)
, rp ≥ rg. (35)
Using this distribution to compute the expectation in Eq. 34 leads to the final result in Theorem 4.
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